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ABSTRACT

The Agreement Establishingthe World Trade Organization
(WTO) foresees that trade should be conducted with a view to
raisingstandardsof living. It is undisputed that raisingliving
standards contributes to the implementation of the right to food.
Indeed, state parties to the WTO have obligations regardingthe
right to food not only under the internationaltrade system, but
also under the human rights regime. All WTO state parties are
bound by customary human rights law, and most have ratified
the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights, of which Article 11 contains the most important
codification of the right to food. This Article analyzes the
structural similarities between the legal regimes for trade and
human rights. It concludes that the tools necessary to reconcile
some of the potential conflicts between the two regimes are
already built into the agreements. Building on this conclusion,
this Article analyzes proposals on how to better implement food
security in the current negotiationson agriculture.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Developments in food aid, the production of genetically modified
foods and seeds, the use of foodstuffs to produce biofuels, and
awareness of the cultural significance of certain foodstuffs are just a
few of the elements that have led to heated discussions about the
relationship between international trade and the right to foodespecially food security. Taking into account the multifaceted nature
of the above-mentioned elements, this Article attempts to shed light
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on the legal relationship between trade and food security, that is,
between international trade law and the human right to food
security.
The preamble of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization (WTO) does not envision trade as an end in itself.
Instead, it foresees that trade "should be conducted with a view to
raising standards of living."' This objective, in language and in
spirit, is close to the "adequate standard of living' 2 envisaged in
Article 11(1) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights (ICESCR). In fact, both the codification of human
rights and what later became the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) have their common starting point in the Atlantic
Charter, which contained a vision of a post-war world order resting
3
on the four pillars of trade, finance, peace, and human rights.
Despite this commonality between ICESCR and the GATT, the
liberalization of trade in agriculture and the right to food have
nevertheless developed in very different ways.
Conflicts and tensions may arise at the implementation level.
This is reflected in the widespread concern that the openness of
agricultural trade may jeopardize food security in developing
countries, for example by flooding local markets with imported
products or even with goods provided under the guised heading of
food aid. 4 The concern is that exposure to international markets may
increase the instability of food supplies and prices, disrupt markets,
and undermine incentives for local production. 5 Yet from an economic
point of view, empirical evidence on an aggregate country level "does
not point to a negative relationship between agricultural trade and
food security; on the contrary, a higher degree of openness to trade is
6
associated with lower levels of undernourishment."
The preceding statement is flawed in several respects. First,
while this observation may hold true in general, it is also true "that
some households lose in the process of trade liberalization," even in
the long run. 7 Trade reform could also exacerbate poverty and

1.
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, pmbl.,
Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter WTO Agreement].
2.
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 11,
Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 7 [hereinafter ICESCRI.
3.
Christine Breining-Kaufmann, The Legal Matrix of Human Rights and
Trade Law: State Obligations versus PrivateRights and Obligations, in HUMAN RIGHTS

& INT'L TRADE 95, 96 (Thomas Cottier, Joost Pauwelyn & Elisabeth Birgi eds., 2005).
4.
See, e.g., Carmen G. Gonzalez, Institutionalizing Inequality: the WTO
Agreement on Agriculture, Food Security, and Developing Countries, 27 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 433, 435-36 (2002) (attributing decreased agricultural revenues in the
southern hemisphere to the openness of agricultural trade).
5.
Id. at 438.
6.
Food & Agric. Org. of the U.N. [FAO], The State of Food and Agriculture
2005: AgriculturalTrade and Poverty-Can Trade Work for the Poor?, at 83-84 (2005).

7.

Id. at 84.

1042

VANDERBILTJOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

IVOL. 40.1039

therefore reduce food security temporarily. 8 Second, the concept of
food security includes more than the alleviation of malnourishment; it
refers to other factors such as culture or the survival of subsistence
farmers. 9 Regardless of the complementarity of goals between
liberalization of trade in agriculture and the right to food security at
the abstract level, tensions may arise: even if there are overall gains
at the national level, the impact on individuals can be negative. The
liberalization of trade in agriculture is conceptually concerned with
aggregate improvements in global welfare; the human right to food,
on the other hand, grants a minimum standard to the individual that
must not be violated, even at the price of an aggregate rise in the
standard of living.10
To lay the groundwork for a discussion of both regimes (trade
liberalization on the one hand, and the human right to food on the
other), this Article will start with a brief discussion of the legal
architecture for world trade in agriculture. Next, it will analyze the
normative content of the right to food and the corresponding state
obligations. A discussion of potential avenues for reconciling the legal
frameworks of trade in agriculture and the right to food will follow.
Finally, the Article will explore current issues and critically review
some of the proposals put forward during the Doha Round that intend
to shape agricultural trade in a way that would be more supportive of
the right to food.

II.

THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR TRADE IN AGRICULTURE

Agriculture has proven particularly problematic for international
trade regulation. Although the disciplines introduced by the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) n in 1947 applied to
agricultural and industrial products without distinction, the approach
of the GATT toward agriculture was "one of waivers from, exceptions
to, or disregard of the applicable rules."'1 2 This approach was

8.

WORLD TRADE ORG., SPECIAL STUDIES No. 5, TRADE, INCOME DISPARITY &

POVERTY 6 (1999) (prepared by Dan Ben-David et al.); see also SANDRA POLASKI,
WINNERS AND LOSERS-IMPACT OF THE DOHA ROUND ON DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

(2006) (presenting findings that there are both net winners and net losers under
different scenarios and that the poorest countries are among the net losers under all
likely Doha scenarios).
9.
See, e.g., MARSHA ECHOLS, FOOD SAFETY AND THE WTO: THE INTERPLAY OF
CULTURE, SCIENCE, AND TECHNOLOGY 17-19, 29-33 (2001).
10.
See Kerstin Mechlem, Harmonizing Trade in Agriculture Human Rights:
Options for the Integration of the Right to Food into the Agreement on Agriculture, 10
MAX PLANCK YEARBOOK OF UNITED NATIONS LAW 127, 187 (2006).
11.
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-3, 55
U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
12.
JOSEPH MCMAHON, THE WTO AGREEMENT ON AGRICULTURE: A
COMMENTARY, at vii (2006).
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abandoned following the Uruguay Round and its Agreement on
Agriculture (AoA). 13 The AoA attempts to establish "a fair and
market-oriented agricultural trading system" 14 through "substantial
progressive reduction in agricultural support and protection." 15 The
AoA consists of three main pillars: market access, cuts in domestic
The
producer subsidies, and reduction in export subsidies. 16
implementation period was an agreed-upon six years (ten years for
17
with the exception of Article 13, the so-called
developing countries),
"peace clause."' 8 This provision limited the possibility of disputes
These rules were
and would remain in effect for nine years.' 9
accompanied by the Marrakesh Ministerial Decision on Measures
Concerning the Possible Negative Effects of the Reform Process on
Least-Developed and Net-Food-Importing Developing Countries
(Marrakesh Decision). 20 The Marrakesh Decision itself recognizes
that implementation of the reform package in agriculture may have
negative effects on the ability of these countries to finance normal
foodstuffs, and that appropriate
levels of commercial imports of basic
21
measures need to be established.
A. Market Access
As in other WTO agreements, the AoA committed its members to
improve market access through tariffication and through binding
these tariffs against future increases. 22 This resulted in a key

13.
Id.
Agreement on Agriculture pmbl., Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
14.
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, Legal Instruments-Results of
the Uruguay Round, 1867 U.N.T.S 410 (1994) [hereinafter AoA].
15.
Id.
16.

WTO SECRETARIAT, GUIDE TO THE URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS 52 (John

Croome ed. 1999).
AoA, supra note 14, arts. 1(0,15(2) (stating that least-developed countries
17.
were not required to undertake reduction commitments).
18.
Id. art. 13; WTO SECRETARIAT, supra note 16, at 61.
19.
WTO SECRETARIAT, supra note 16, at 61.
20.
Decision on Measures Concerning the Possible Negative Effects of the
Reform Programme on Least-Developed and Net Food-Importing Developing
Countries, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Decisions adopted by the Trade Negotiations committee-Results of the
Uruguay Round, 1867 U.N.T.S. 60 (1994) [hereinafter Reform Programme].
Id. arts. 2-3.
21.
The reduction commitments apply to both traditional tariffs and the tariffs
22.
resulting from tariffication. In case of bound tariffs, the reduction was to be from the
bound rate, in case of unbound tariffs, from the rate in effect on 1 September 1986. For
developed Members the average reduction was to be 36% over six years, whereas for
developing Members the average reduction was to be 24% to be implemented over a
ten-year period. Least-developed Members were not required to undertake any
reduction commitments, although they were required to tariffy and bind their tariffs.
Negotiating Group on Access, Note by the Chairman of the Market Access Group:
3-5,
Modalities for the Establishment of Specific Binding Commitments,
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systemic change, with many of the existing non-tariff trade barriers
being subject to conversion into tariffs (tariffication), 23 thus limiting
virtually all import protection to tariffs and tariff quotas. 24 These are
"more transparent and easier to negotiate than non-tariff
'

measures. "25

The level of import protection for agriculture remains very high,
however, especially in industrialized countries. 26 One of the reasons
for the limited impact of the market access provisions is that the
reduction commitments were expressed as an average reduction
rather than as a reduction in the average tariff.27 This formula
allowed Members to reduce high tariffs on sensitive products by a
smaller percentage, while cutting already low tariffs on less sensitive
28
products by a higher percentage.
B. Domestic Support
The second pillar of the AoA is the commitment to reduce tradedistorting domestic support measures. 29 Conceptually, there are two
categories of domestic support: support with little or no distortive
effect on trade, and trade-distorting support.3 0 Distortive support
measures are subject to different reduction commitments. 31 These
commitments are expressed as a single figure, called the "Total
Aggregate Measurement of Support" (Total AMS, Article 1 of the
AoA), which includes all existing support measures.32

MTN.GNG/MAIW/24 (Dec. 20, 1993), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/gen
search.asp?searchmode=simple (search "Basic search" for article title)
23.
Christine Breining-Kaufmann, The Right to Food and Trade in Agriculture,
in HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 341, 344 (Thomas Cottier, Joost
Pauwelyn & Elisabeth Btirgi eds., 2005).
24.
MCMAHON, supra note 12, at 33.
25.
Id.
26.
WORLD BANK GROUP, INT'L TRADE DEP'T, TRADE NOTE 6, MARKET ACCESS:
AGRICULTURAL POLICY REFORM AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 1 (2003) (prepared by
Harry de
Gorter
et al.), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/
INTRANETTRADE/Resources/TradeNote6.pdf.
27.
Id. at 2.
28.
Id. at 3. Since the actual conversion of non-tariff barriers into the tariff
equivalents was left to the countries themselves, a number of Members engaged in
what, since the GATT 1947, has been referred to as 'dirty tariffication' by establishing
tariff equivalents at much higher levels than their corresponding non-tariff barriers in
order to create artificially high levels of tariffs from which reductions had to start. As a
result, the US and the EC have de facto not significantly facilitated access to their
markets. Mechlem, supra note 10, at 142-43.
29.
WTO SECRETARIAT, supra note 16, at 52.
30.
Id. at 56.
31.
MCMAHON, supra note 12, at 69. See also MITSUO MATSUSHITA, THOMAS J.
SCHOENBAUM & PETROS C. MAVROIDIS, THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: LAW,
PRACTICE AND POLICY 301-05 (2006) (describing the calculation of the Base Total
Aggregate Measurement of Support as benchmark for commitments).
32.
MCMAHON, supra note 12, at 69; AoA, supra note 14, art. 1(h).
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Article 6 of the AoA "exempts a number of domestic support
measures from the reduction commitments. ' 33 "The fundamental
criterion that support must meet in order to be exempt is to be
34
economically neutral, in accordance with Annex 2, paragraph i."
"In addition, the specific requirements listed in Part 2 of Annex 2
must be fulfilled. '35 The first exemption allows members to provide
product-specific support up to a de minimis threshold, which is set at
five percent for developed countries and ten percent for developing
countries. 36 Second, Article 6.2 of the AoA lists exempted domestic
support measures to encourage agricultural and rural development in
This list includes generally available
developing countries.
agricultural investment subsidies, agricultural input subsidies
generally available to low-income and resource-poor producers, and
domestic support to encourage diversification away from growing
illicit narcotic crops. 37 The third exemption from the reduction
commitments is direct payment provided under production-limiting
programs. 38 This is the notorious "Blue Box," which allows support
that is clearly market-distorting, but "was considered necessary to
secure an overall agreement on agriculture, especially from the point
of the view of the [European Community] .,39 The rationale for this
provision is that eventually, "through such programmes[,] the total
output of farm products in some [regions] will fall (and so will the
40
argument for trade protection in these [regions]).
The final group of domestic support measures not subject to the
reduction commitment, the so-called "Green Box," is defined in Annex
The first category of Green Box measures
2 of the AoA.4 1
encompasses government service programs for agriculture and the
rural community. 42 Such programs may include pest and disease
for training
and
information, providing
control,
support
infrastructure such as drinking water,4 3 or research programs. 44 A

33.

MCMAHON, supra note 12, at 69; AoA, supra note 14, art. 6.1.

34.
Breining-Kaufmann, supra note 23, at 345.
35.
Id.
36.
AoA, supra note 14, art. 6.4.
Id. art. 6.2.
37.
Id. art. 6.5.
38.
39.
McMAHON, supra note 12, at 70 (noting that the Blue Box "would
accommodate the 1992 reforms of the Common Agricultural Policy without making
such reforms subject to reduction commitments.").
40.
MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 31, at 306.
41.
See Breining-Kaufmann, supra note 23, at 345.
42.
AoA, supra note 14, Annex 2, 2.
43.
This relates directly to the recent General Comment of the Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights [CESCRI on the right to water. U.N. Econ. &
Soc. Council [ECOSOC], CESCR, Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of
the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, General
Comment No. 15, arts. 11-12, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2002/11 (Jan. 20, 2003); BreiningKaufmann, supra note 23, at 345 n.19.
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second category deals with food aid, where several specific criteria
must apply before there is an exemption. For instance, paragraph 3
of Annex 2 exempts public stockholding for food security purposes,
subject to compliance with specific requirements. 45 Food aid, in the
form of a domestic food-aid program for people in need, is exempt as
well, provided that the government buys products at "current market
prices," and that the financing and administration of the aid is
transparent. 46 The third category of Green Box support, direct
payments, can become relevant in the food context when they are
granted for relief from natural disasters, 47 as structural adjustment
assistance, 48 under environmental programs, 49 or under regional
Direct payments cannot be linked to
assistance programs. 50
51
production decisions (decoupling).
C. Export Competition
The third pillar of the AoA is the commitment to reduce export
subsidies. 52 The AoA limits the use of export subsidies to specific
situations mentioned in Article 9.53 Article 9.1 lists the six types of
54
export subsidy that are subject to a reduction commitment.
Generally, "[t]he export subsidy commitments relate to both the
'55
amount of money spent and the quantity exported.
Article 8 prohibits Members from providing export subsidies that
do not conform to the Agreement or to the commitments in their
schedule. In order to prevent countries from using export subsidies
not specifically listed in Article 9 to circumvent reduction of other
export subsidy commitments, the AoA contains an anti-circumvention
provision in Article 10.56 That provision includes a definition of food
aid 5 7 "so that transactions claimed to be food aid, but not meeting the
58
criteria in the AoA, cannot be used to undermine commitments.1

44.
AoA, supra note 14, Annex 2, 1 2.
45.
Id. Annex 2, 45 n.5.
46.
Id. Annex 2, 4.
47.
Id. 8.
11.
48.
Id.
12.
49.
Id.
Id.
13.
50.
Id. 6.
51.
52.
WTO SECRETARIAT, supra note 16, at 52.
53.
Id. at 59.
54.
AoA, supra note 14, art. 9.1.
55.
MCMAHON, supra note 12, at 96.
56.
AoA, supra note 14, art. 10, 1.
57.
Id. art. 10, 4 (stipulating not a firm commitment but that Members "shall
ensure" the provisions set forth). See generally FAO, Trade Policy Technical Note 8,
Food Aid In The Context Of InternationalAnd Domestic Markets And The Doha Round
(2005), available at ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/007/j5072e/j5072eOO.pdf (providing an
overview of the food aid disciplines in the AoA).
58.
Breining-Kaufmann, supra note 23, at 346.
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Food aid that meets the criteria is not considered to be a subsidized
59
export, and thus is not limited by the AoA.
D. The Marrakesh Decision on Least-Developed and Net FoodImporting Countries
The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
(FAO) has noted that "[d]uring the Uruguay Round, negotiators were
concerned that agricultural reform could have negative effects on
least-developed and net-food importing developing countries (LDCs
and NFIDCs) ....,,60 Specifically, negotiators were concerned about
available supplies of "basic foodstuffs from external sources on
reasonable terms and conditions," as well as
short-term difficulties in financing normal levels of commercial
imports.... Several analyses had shown that the reform process was
likely to increase food import bills as world prices of basic food[stuffls
were expected to increase, and that these countries could be[come]
[increasingly] dependent on food imports as they open[ed] their
61
economies, while food aid would [simultaneously] decline.

The response was the Marrakesh Decision. 6 2 The Marrakesh
Decision included four response mechanisms: (1) food aid, (2) shortterm financing of normal levels of commercial imports, (3) favorable
terms for agricultural export credits, and (4) technical and financial
63
assistance to improve agricultural productivity and infrastructure.
The definition of the beneficiaries of the Marrakesh Decision was left
6 4
to the Committee on Agriculture.

59.
Id.
60.
FAO, The Right to Food Guidelines: Information Papers and Case Studies,
at 66 (2006), available at ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/010/a051le/a0511e02.pdf
[hereinafter Right to Food].
61.
Id. at 66-67; see also Breining-Kaufmann, supra note 23, at 346-47.
62.
Right to Food, supra note 60, at 67; see also Reform Programme, supra note
20.
63.
Reform Programme, supra note 20,
3-5.
64.
The Committee used the least-developed countries as recognized by the
U.N. As for net food-importing countries, the Committee decided that any developing
country which had been a net importer of basic foodstuffs in any three of the past five
years for which data was available and which notified the Committee that it wished to
be listed as a net food-importing developing country would be so listed. Comm. on
Agric., WTO List of Net Food-ImportingDeveloping Countries for the Purposes of the
Marrakesh MinisterialDecision on Measures Concerning the Possible Negative Effects
of the Reform Programme on Least-Developed and Net Food-Importing Developing
Countries ('The Decision"), G/AG/5/Rev.8
(Mar. 22,
2005), available at
http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/G/AG/5R8.doc
(listing net food-importing
countries as Barbados, Botswana, C6te dIvoire, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic,
Egypt, Gabon, Honduras, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Mauritius, Mongolia, Morocco,
Namibia, Pakistan, Peru, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia and Venezuela); see
also MCMAHON, supra note 12, at 177 n.45.
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The Marrakesh Decision, however, has not been satisfactorily
In fact, the Doha WTO Ministerial Conference
implemented.
included the Marrakesh Decision as one of its implementation
issues. 65 Notwithstanding its weak implementation, the Marrakesh
Decision is important because it calls for "a level of food aid
commitments sufficient to meet the legitimate needs of developing
countries during the reform programme." 66 The Marrakesh Decision
thereby acknowledges that increasing welfare through trade
for
liberalization is coupled with an increase in the legitimate needs
67
process.
the
by
harmed
are
that
countries
those
of
assistance

III. THE LEGAL

FRAMEWORK FOR THE RIGHT TO FOOD

Food security is a concept which includes diverse elements, as
reflected by the many attempts to define it in both research and
political practice.6 8 More than a decade ago, there were already
about two hundred such definitions in published writings.6 9 The
most widely accepted definition of food security can be found in the
1996 World Food Summit Declaration, which understands food
security as a situation in which "all people, at all times, have physical
and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet
their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy
life." 70
A. Legal Instruments
In this Article, food security is reviewed under a rights-based
perspective, which is thus conceptualized as being included in the
human right to adequate food. 7 1 The right to food has been

World Trade Org., Ministerial Decision of 14 November 2001,
65.
WT/MIN(01)/17, 41 I.L.M. 757 (Nov. 14, 2002).
Reform Programme, supra note 20, 3, sec. (i) (emphasis added).
66.
Mechlem, supra note 10,at 160.
67.
Marisol Smith et al., Household Food Security: Concepts and Definitions, in
68.
HOUSEHOLD FOOD SECURITY: CONCEPTS, INDICATORS,

MEASUREMENT

136

(Simon

Maxwell & Timothy Frenkenberger eds., 1992).
Id.
69.
70.
FAO, World Food Summit Plan of Action, 1 , FAO Doc. W3613/E (Nov. 13,
1998), available at http://www.fao.org/DOCREP/003/W3613EW3613EO0.HTM [hereinafter
World Food Summit].
A rights-based approach to food security introduces the fundamental
71.
principles of participation, accountability, equality and non-discrimination to food
policies. The accountability dimension facilitates the conceptual clarification of the
responsibilities and corresponding duties of a state to protect, respect, and fulfill the
right to adequate food of its citizens. See infra Part III.B. Compare BreiningKaufmann, supra note 23, at 359 (noting that a rights-based concept of food security
could also help in "drawing the line between a morally required right to food and
morally unacceptable claims or want[s]"), with Thomas Pogge, Recognized and Violated
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recognized as a human right in numerous binding and non-binding
legal instruments since it was first established in 1948 as part of
Article 25(1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 72 Of all
these documents, Article 11 of the International Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights of 1966 contains the most
important codification of the right to food: "The States
Parties ... recognize the right of everyone to an adequate standard of
' 73
living ...including adequate food."

The first link between the realization of the right to food and
international trade is expressed in Article 11(2) of ICESCR, which
states that
[tihe States Parties to the present Covenant, recognizing the
fundamental right of everyone to be free from hunger, shall take,
individually and through international co-operation, the measures,
including specific programmes, which are needed[,] . . . [tlaking into
account the problems of both food-importing and food-exporting
countries, to ensure an equitable distribution of world food supplies in
74
relation to need.

In 1996, the World Food Summit adopted by consensus the Rome
Declaration on World Food Security and World Food Summit Plan of
75
Action, which outlined ways to achieve universal food security.
Commitment Four of this Plan of Action specifically addresses the
link between trade and the right to food, and aims at a coherent
interpretation of state obligations in both international trade law and
human rights instruments. 76 Commitment Seven, on the other hand,
introduces a concept of mainstreaming the right to food into other
77
legal obligations.

by InternationalLaw: The Human Rights of the Global Poor, 18 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 717,
720 (2005) (describing his approach to conceiving economic and social rights narrowly
as only imposing negative duties not to harm).
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d
72.
Convention on the Rights
Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948); see, e.g.,
of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, Annex, arts. 24(2), 27, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No.
49, U.N. Doc. A/44149 (Nov. 20, 1989); Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women, G.A. Res. 34/180, art. 12, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess.,
Supp. No. 46, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (Dec. 18, 1979); International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), art. 6, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16,
U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966).
ICESCR, supra note 2, art. 11(1). The United States is not a party to the
73.
ICESCR. See Philip Alston, U.S. Ratification of the Covenant on Economic, Social and
CulturalRights: The Need for an Entirely New Strategy, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 365, 372-77
(1990) (offering an overview of the U.S. position with respect to economic, social and
cultural rights).
74.
ICESCR, supra note 2, art. 11(2), at 7.
75.
World Food Summit, supra note 70.
76.
Id.
37-41.
77.
Id.
54-62.
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In response to the invitation in objective 7.4 of the World Food
Summit Plan of Action, 78 the United Nations Committee on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (CESCR) adopted General
Comment No. 12 in May 1999, in which it developed the normative
content of the right to adequate food as reflecting the core minimum
obligations of states, as well as the obligations of the international
community. 79 According to the CESCR, the core content of the right
to adequate food implies: (a) "the availabilityof food in a quantity and
quality sufficient to satisfy the dietary needs of individuals, free from
adverse substances, and acceptable within a given culture;"8 0 and (b)
"the accessibility of such food in ways that are sustainable and that
81
do not interfere with the enjoyment of other human rights.
General Comment No. 12 defines the right to food as being
"realized when every man, woman and child, alone or in community
with others, have physical and economic access at all times to
adequate food or means for its procurement. '8 2 For the one hundred
and fifty-seven states party to the Covenant, this constitutes an
authoritative interpretation of their obligation to progressively
realize the right to adequate food as enshrined in Article 2(1) and
83
Article 11 of ICESCR.
The most recent international instrument containing a provision
for the realization of the right to food is the Voluntary Guidelines to
Support the Progressive Realization of the Right to Adequate Food in
the Context of National Food Security (Voluntary Guidelines), which
were adopted by FAO in 2004.84
According to the Voluntary

78.
See id.
61 (inviting a better definition of the rights related to food in
Article 11 of the ICESCR and proposals for ways to implement and realize these
rights).
79.
CESCR, General Comment 12, Substantive Issues Arising in the
Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/19995 (May 12, 1999) [hereinafter General Comment 12]. See
generally Philip Alston, The HistoricalOrigins of the Concept of 'General Comments' in
Human Rights Law, in THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM IN QUEST OF EQUITY AND
UNIVERSALITY 763 (Laurence Boisson de Chazournes & Vera Gowlland-Debbas eds.,
2001) (analyzing the status of General Comments under international law).
80.
General Comment 12, supra note 79,
8 (emphasis added); see also id.
12.
81.
Id. 8 (emphasis added); see also id. 13.
82.
Id.
6.
83.
Since the United States has not ratified the ICESCR, see supra note 74, the
General Comment has neither force nor effect on its international responsibilities. See,
e.g., George P. Smith, II, Human Rights and Bioethics: Formulatinga Universal Right
to Health, Health Care, or Health Protection?, 38 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1295, 1318
(2005) (noting the impracticability of enforcing a General Comment, as well as its
nonjusticiability). But see Smita Narula, The Right to Food: Holding Global Actors
Accountable Under InternationalLaw, 44 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 691, 771-97 (2006)
(discussing accountability of non-ratifying states via customary international law).
84.
FAO, Voluntary Guidelines to Support the Progressive Realization of the
Right to Adequate Food in the Context of National Food Security (2004), available at
ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/meeting/009/y9825e/y9825eO1 .pdf.
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Guidelines, "[i]nternational trade can play a major role in the
promotion of economic development . . .and improving food security
at the national level. '8 5
Therefore, the Voluntary Guidelines
recommend states to promote international trade.8 6 At the same
time, paragraph 8 "recall[s] the long-term objective of the [AoA] to
establish a fair and market-oriented trading system," and calls for a
"fundamental reform . . .in order to correct and prevent restrictions
and distortions in world agricultural markets. '8 7 However, the
Voluntary Guidelines cover a combination of binding and non-binding
content and do not create new rights or obligations.8 8 The guidelines
are intended to provide governments with a practical instrument for
the implementation of the right to adequate food according to their
obligations under the ICESCR, at both the national and international
levels.

B. State Obligationsunder the ICESCR
In his report on the right to adequate food as a human right,
then-Special Rapporteur Asbjorn Eide (senior fellow at the
Norwegian Institute of Human Rights, University of Oslo) developed
a three-level typology of states' duties8 9 that is now a widely used
framework for analyzing the human rights obligations of states.90
Moreover, the Committee follows Eide's approach in General
Comment 12, stating that "the right to adequate food . .. imposes
three types or levels of obligations on States parties: the obligations
to respect, to protect and to fulfill."91 Although the Committee places
responsibility to respect, protect, and fulfill the right to adequate food
on the national government, the Committee also considers that state
parties to the Covenant "should take steps to respect the enjoyment of
the right to food in other countries, to protect that right, to facilitate
access to food and to provide the necessary aid when required. '92

85.
Id. § III, 1 6.
86.
Id.
7.
87.
Id.
8.
88.
See id. §§ II-Ill.
89.
ECOSOC, Sub-Comm. on Prevention of Discrimination & Prot. of
Minorities, The New International Economic Order and the Promotion of Human
Rights: Report on the Right to Adequate Food as a Human Right, Fig. 1, U.N. Doc.
EICN.4/Sub.2/1987123 (July 7, 1987).
90.
Id.; General Comment 12, supra note 79, 15.
91.
General Comment 12, supra note 79, 15.
92.
Id.
36 (emphasis added). Extraterritorial obligations advocated inter alia
by the Special Rapporteur on the right to food, infra note 93, are currently widely
debated to improve the understanding of the definition and content of these
obligations. See, e.g., Sigrun Skogly, The Obligation of International Assistance and
Co-operationin the InternationalCovenant on Economic, Social and CulturalRights, in
HUMAN RIGHTS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE FOR THE DOWNTRODDEN: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF

ASBJORN EIDE 403 (Morten Bergsmo ed., 2003) (discussing the "extraterritorial
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The Obligation to Respect
According to Jean Ziegler, current UN-Special Rapporteur on the

right to food,
[t]he obligation to respect means that the Government should not
arbitrarily [deprive people] of their right to food or make it difficult for
them to gain access to food. The obligation to respect the right to food
is effectively a negative obligation, as it entails limits on the exercise of
State power that might threaten people's existing access to food.
Violations of the obligation to respect would occur, for example, if the
Government arbitrarily evicted or displaced people from their land,
93
especially if the land was their primary means of [subsistence].

Further examples include the government lifting social security
provisions without ensuring alternatives for vulnerable groups to feed
themselves, or the government knowingly introducing toxic
substances into the food chain, and thus violating the right to access
94
to food that is "free from adverse substances.
The extraterritorial obligation to respect the right to food
requires states to "do no harm. '9 5 In other words, it requires states to
ensure that their policies and measures do not lead to violations of
the right to food for people living in other countries. 96 In addition,
states have to ensure that the right to food is given adequate
consideration in international agreements. 97 "[T]he failure of a state
to take into account its international legal obligations regarding the
right to food when entering into agreements with other States or with
international organizations" therefore amounts to a violation of its
98
obligations under the ICESCR.
2.

The Obligation to Protect

General Comment 12 also states that "[t]he obligation to protect
requires measures by the state to ensure that enterprises or
individuals do not deprive individuals of their access to adequate
food," i.e., to ensure horizontal effectiveness. 9 9 If private subjects are

obligations that derive from the [ICESCR]"); Narula, supra note 84, at 727-35
(discussing extraterritorial application of the ICESCR where (1) jurisdiction is
exercised through "effective control" and (2) under the obligation of international
cooperation).
93.
Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Report of the Special Rapporteur on

the Right to Food-Economic,Social and CulturalRights: The Right to Food, 22, delivered
to the U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council,Comm. on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. ECN.412006/44 (Mar.
16, 2006), available at http:lldaccessdds.un.orgdocUNDOC/GEN/GO6/118/82/PDF/
G0611882.pdfOpenElement [hereinafter Special Rapporteur].
94.
General Comment 12, supra note 79, 8.
95.
Special Rapporteur, supra note 93, 35.

96.

Id.

97.
98.

General Comment 12, supra note 79,
Id.
19.

99.

Id.

15.

36.
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to be held directly responsible, relevant domestic provisions, usually
in constitutional law, are necessary.' 0 0 In sum, governments must
establish bodies to investigate and provide effective remedies,
including access to justice, for investigating potential violations of the
right to food. 10 1

Extraterritorially, the obligation to protect requires states to
ensure that their citizens and the institutions within their
jurisdiction do not violate the right to food of people living in other
countries. 10 2 As mentioned above, fulfilment of this obligation can be
ensured best by establishing domestic regulations which make sure
that activities by private actors, including business enterprises, do
not undermine their home state's obligation to protect the right to
10 3
food in other countries.
3.

The Obligation to Fulfill

According to General Comment 12, "[t]he obligation to fulfill
(facilitate) means the state must pro-actively engage in activities
intended to strengthen people's access to and [use] of resources and
means to ensure their livelihood, including food security."'10 4 Given
its positive nature, the obligation requires a government to actively
"identify
vulnerable
groups
and
implement
policies
to
improve ...

people's access to adequate food and their ability to feed

themselves.' 10 5 The FAO states that "[tihese activities do not
necessarily entail the provision of substantial financial resources and
could [simply entail] ensuring access to information regarding
opportunities to satisfy the right to food."'1 6 The FAO elaborates that
"[e]xamples of typical measures to facilitate access to food include
education and training, agrarian reform, policies supportive of urban
10 7
and rural development, [and] market information," among others.
"Finally," General Comment 12 states, "whenever an individual
or a group is unable, for reasons beyond their control, to enjoy the
right to adequate food by the means at their disposal, states have the

100.

The

INTERNATIONAL

so-called
COVENANT

Drittwirkung.
ON

ECONOMIC,

See

MATTHEW

SOCIAL

AND

C.

R.

CRAVEN,

CULTURAL

THE

RIGHTS:

A

PERSPECTIVE ON ITS DEVELOPMENT 111-12 (Clarendon Press 1995); Breining
Kaufmann, supra note 23, at 363.
101.
General Comment 12, supra note 79,
32-33.
102.
Id. T 19.
103.
Fons Coomans, Some Remarks on the ExtraterritorialApplication of the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in
EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES 183, 190, 193 (Fons

Coomans & Menno T. Kamminga eds., 2004).
104.
General Comment 12, supra note 79,
15.
105.
Special Rapporteur, supra note 93, 24.
106.
Right to Food, supra note 60, at 82.
107.

Id.
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obligation to fulfill (provide)that right directly." 10 8 Direct assistance
may take the form of safety nets such as food voucher schemes or
social security provisions to ensure freedom from hunger. General
Comment 12 goes on to say that "[t]his obligation also applies for
persons who are victims of natural or other disasters."' 0 9
The extraterritorial obligation to "facilitate [the] realization of
the right to food does not necessarily require resources or
international aid," but rather international cooperation to meet the
goal of creating an environment that allows for the realization of the
right to food in all countries. 110
States claiming that resource
constraints make it impossible for them to fulfill the right to food are
obliged to actively seek international assistance."'
The Special
Rapporteur to the United Nations states that
[t]o support the fulfillment of the right to food . .. [s]tates have a joint
and individual responsibility . . . to cooperate in providing disaster
relief and humanitarian assistance in times of emergency ....
Each
112
state should contribute to this task in accordance with its ability.

Products included in international food aid programs must be
"safe and culturally acceptable to the recipient population."1 3
Studies show, however, that food aid is often not tailored to the needs
of countries, but rather used as an instrument for disposing of the
surpluses of developed countries." 4 As a result, there is not an
empirically established relationship between food crises or shortages
and food aid." 5 Additionally, food aid "should be organized in ways
that facilitate the return to food self-reliance" and do not adversely
affect local producers and local markets. 116 Again, because of the
described strategy, food aid often consists of products that, due to
mass production, are much cheaper than local foods and therefore
hinder the recovery of local market structures. 117 In addition, such a
policy may also affect culturally important goods since they are

108.
General Comment 12, supra note 79, 15.
109.
Id.
110.
Special Rapporteur, supra note 93, 37.
111.
General Comment 12, supra note 79, 17. "States that, through neglect or
misplaced national pride, make no such appeal or deliberately delay such appeals are
violating their obligation." Id.; see also Special Rapporteur, supranote 93, 24.
112.
Special Rapporteur, supra note 93, 38 (emphasis added).
113.
Id.
114.
See FAO, The State of Food and Agriculture 2006: Food Aid for Food
Security?, at 10-11 (2006), available at http://www.fao.org/docrep/009/aOSOOe/
aO800e0O.htm [hereinafter State of Food] (noting a finding, among others, that
"[e]conometric evidence from the early years of international food aid confirmed the
role of commodity prices and stocks as the key determinants of food aid donations.")
(emphasis added).
115.
Id. at 40.
116.
General Comment 12, supra note 79, 39.
117.
See State of Food, supra note 114, at 38-40 (analyzing the effect of food aid
on food prices in certain types of markets).
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usually produced locally. In sum, the practice of disposing of food
surpluses as food aid conflicts with the obligation to fulfill the right to
food in a manner that does not adversely affect local markets. The
case of Somalia, a country that reduced its own farming activities and
thus became completely dependent on food aid, illustrates this
argument. 118
C. ProgressiveRealization of the Right to Food
The ICESCR requires state parties to take steps toward the
progressive realization of the right to adequate food. 119 Progressive
realization implies moving "as expeditiously as possible"'120 toward
this goal. According to the Special Rapporteur, "[t]he concept of
'progressive realization' cannot be used to justify persistent injustice
and inequality. It requires [g]overnments to take immediate steps 12to1
continuously improve" the enjoyment of the right to adequate food.
This also implies the "principle of non-regression": if state parties
deteriorate access to food through policy or legislation without
implementing compensatory measures, those policies or laws would
be inconsistent with the obligations under the Covenant.' 22 A
prominent example of this is an increase in the country's military
123
budget at the expense of food production or food imports.
While the right to adequate food in Article 11(1) is a "relative"
right to be free from hunger in Article 11(2) is
standard, '1the
"absolute, 2 4 and is the only right in the Covenant termed
"fundamental."'125 To further clarify, the CESCR stated in General

118.
Id. at 38.
ICESCR, supra note 2, art. 11(1).
119.
120.
General Comment 12, supra note 79, 14.
121.
Special Rapporteur, supra note 93, 26.
122.
Cf. Office of the U.N. High Comm'r for Human Rights [OCHCR], CESCR, The
11, U.N. Doc.
Right to Adequate Housing: CESCR General Comment 4, art. 11(1),
E/1992/23 (Dec. 13, 1991), reprinted in U.N. Doc HRIIGEN/1/REV.8, available at
http://www.ohchr.org/englisbbodies/cescr/comments.htm.
123.
See, e.g., STEPHAN HAGGARD & MARcUS NOLAND, HUNGER AND HUMAN
RIGHTS: THE POLITICS OF FOOD IN NORTH KOREA 16 (U.S. Committee for Human Rights
in North Korea ed., 2005); cf. ECOSOC, Concluding Observations of the Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Democratic Republic of Korea, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/l/Add.95 (Dec. 12, 2003) (inviting the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to
explore the possibility of increasing the budgetary allocations for social expenditure
and public assistance for people in need).
THE RIGHT TO FOOD: GUIDE THROUGH APPLICABLE INTERNATIONAL LAW, at
124.
xviii (Katarina Tomagevski ed., 1987).
125.
ICESCR, supra note 2, art. 11(2). It is interesting that the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights implies a right to food as part of the fundamental
right to life found in Article 6. See OCHCR, General Comment No. 06, The Right to Life,
5, U.N. Doc. HRIIGEN/1/REV.1 (Apr. 30, 1982), available at http://www.
(art. 6),
unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/84ab9690ccd81fc7c12563ed0046fae3?Opendocument (stating that
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Comment 3 that state parties "have a minimum core obligation to
ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least, minimum essential
levels."'1 26 Thus, states have a core obligation to take action to ensure
that, at the very least, people under their jurisdiction have access to
the minimum essential food necessary to achieve their freedom from
hunger.127

The obligation of non-discrimination is also subject to immediate
implementation. 128 Discrimination in access to food, as well as to the
means and entitlements for its procurement, "on the grounds of race,
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or
social origin, property, birth, or other status, as stated in article 2,
paragraph 2 of the [ICESCR], cannot be justified under any
129
circumstances," including when a state has limited resources.
It is important to note that "in terms of political and economic
systems[J the [ICESCR] is neutral" and was drafted deliberately so
as to accommodate a variety of approaches.' 3 0 Accordingly, one
commentator has argued that "[t]he different levels of state
obligations described above are of crucial importance in
understanding [that the right to adequate food] must not be provided
by the state-such a misconception would overlook the now widely
accepted different levels of state obligations."' 3'1
Hence, "[a]n
internationally liberalized market economy shaped in a human rights
conforming manner can.., offer an appropriate framework to realize
132
the right to food."'

IV. RECONCILING TRADE IN AGRICULTURE AND THE RIGHT TO FOOD

According to Christine Breining-Kaufmann, a leading scholar on
the intersection of trade and human rights, "[t]he similarities
between the legal approach that emphasizes the manifold obligations
of states with regard to the right to food, and the acknowledgement of
the [concerns regarding non-trade issues] are striking."' 3 3 This is

the protection of the "inherent right to life" requires States to "adopto measures to
eliminate malnutrition").
126.
OCHCR, CESCR, General Comment 3, The Nature of States Parties
Obligations (Art. 2, par.1), 7 10, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1990/8 (Dec. 14, 1990), available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/94bdar59b43a424c12563ed0052b664?Opend
ocument [hereinafter General Comment 3].
127.
See General Comment 12, supra note 79, 77 19, 21.
128.
Craven, supra note 100, at 181.
129.
Special Rapporteur, supra note 93, 7 27. However, by contrast to de jure
discrimination, the elimination of de facto discrimination will not always be capable of
being achieved immediately. Craven, supra note 100, at 182.
130.
General Comment 3, supra note 126, 8.
131.
Breining-Kaufmann, supra note 23, at 364.
132.
Mechlem, supranote 10, at 137.
133.
Breining-Kaufmann, supra note 23, at 372.
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particularly true regarding food security in the legal framework of
trade in agriculture: "both put the right to food and the liberalization
of agricultural trade within the broader context of development and
1 34
In this sense, the text of
[the enhancement of] general welfare."'
the WTO Agreement appears to have been carefully drafted so that
that
countries would not be compelled to make commitments 135
contradict their obligations under other multilateral frameworks.
Indeed, states party to the WTO have human rights obligations
concurrent with their commitments in the area of international trade.
Of the WTO's 151 members, 125 have ratified the ICESCR, and all
are bound by customary human rights law and have ratified at least
one human rights treaty. 136 Consequently, a number of human rights
bodies have addressed the relationship and tensions between trade
and human rights in general, or between trade in agriculture and the
137
right to food.
Despite these similarities, in reality, conflicts between the right
to food security and international trade liberalization occur.
A. Conflicts Between the Right to Food Security and Liberalized
Trade in Agriculture
Food aid is one of the most sensitive areas when it comes to
ensuring food security and liberalizing trade in agriculture at the
On one hand, non-emergency food aid can easily
same time.
undermine the system of the AoA if it is a disguised commercial
transaction that would otherwise be subject to export competition
rules. 138 On the other hand, foodstuffs that are bought at subsidized
prices under the current regime will be accounted for in the AMS
139
regardless of whether their purpose is to fight hunger and poverty.

134.
Id.
135.
Cf. id. at 373 (stating that a provision of the UN charter, "which deals with
cases of conflicts between international agreements, is ... not necessary" because calls
for consistency are already built into WTO agreements).
For a list of WTO member states, see World Trade Org., Members and
136.
Observers, http://www.wto.org/englishlthewto e/whatis.e/tif.e/org6_e.htm (last visited
Oct. 8, 2007) (numbers current as of June 15, 2007). For an updated list of signatories
and parties to the ICESCR, see OHCHR, Status by Treaty, http://www.unhchr.cli
tbs/doc.nsr/newhvstatbytreaty?Openview (follow "CESCR-International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights") (last visited Oct. 11, 2007). As of the date of
this Article, the Russian Federation had not become a member of the WTO. See

Russian ministry hopes to settle remaining WTO issues shortly, ITAR-TASS, Oct. 4, 2007,
available at http://www.wto.ru/en/news.asp?msg-id=21237.
See, e.g., ECOSOC, Comm'n on Human Rights, Globalization and
137.
Impact on the Full Enjoyment of Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2002/54 (Jan.
2002), available at http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/dpage-e.aspx?s=115.
See id. 29.
138.
For current proposals to amend this rule in the ongoing negotiations,
139.
Special Session of the Comm. on Agric., Communication from the Chairman of

its
15,

see
the
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One of the issues currently being discussed in the ongoing AoA
negotiations is re-exports of food aid. 140
Some countries have
developed a practice of selling food aid received from other countries
abroad. 14 1 Since food aid does not always fit the needs of a particular
country, such re-export may actually improve the situation in certain
countries by creating the financial means to buy more appropriate
foodstuffs for that country.
The principle of non-discrimination between foreign and
domestic products may affect culturally significant foodstuffs, such as
Japanese rice or Mexican corn. Both have an important cultural
value and are generally produced domestically. 1 42 For instance, over
14 3
forty percent of Mexican corn is grown by subsistence farmers.
The production costs of these farms, however, are relatively high
compared with U.S. farms; American farmers not only benefit from
economies of scale, but are also heavily subsidized. 144 The result is
the so-called "Mexican Corn Crisis." A similar situation for Japanese
rice has led to a great deal of Japanese pressure on the WTO to
remove its very restrictive rice import policy.
On the other side of the coin, the risk of using cultural
importance as an argument for unneeded protectionism is real. This
makes it difficult to find a solution that accommodates both culturally
acceptable food security and the principle of non-discrimination.
Possible approaches are being discussed in ongoing negotiations and
will be addressed in Section V of this Article.
B. Methods for Reconciliation-The 'Linkage'Debate
Article 31(3)c of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
(VCLT) requires states to act in good faith and to comply with the

Committee on Agriculture: Second Instalment,
24-25 (May 25, 2007), available at
http://www.wto.org/englishtratop-e/agric-e/agchairtxt_25may07_e.pdf.
140.
Special Session of the Comm. on Agric., Chair's Reference Paper: Food Aid,
1(v)
(May
10,
2006), available at http://www.wto.org/English/tratop-e/
agric-e/refipaper -foodaid rl e.doc.
141.
See Special Session of the Comm. on Agric., G-20 Comments on Food Aid,
art. IV, JOB(06)/150 (May 19, 2006), available at http://www.agtradepolicy.org/
output/resource/G-20_FoodAid_19MayO6.pdf (stating that the re-exportation of food
aid should be "prohibited" due to the "humanitarian nature of food aid").
142.
OxFAM, BRIEFING PAPER No. 50, DUMPING WITHOUT BORDERS: How US
AGRICULTURAL POLICIES ARE DESTROYING THE LIVELIHOODS OF MEXICAN CORN
FARMERS 5 (2003), available at http:/lwww.oxfamamerica.orglnewsandpublications/
publications/briefing-papers/art5912.htmlOA-Dumping Without Borders.pdf;
Linda
S. Wojtan, RICE: It's More Than Just a Food, JAPAN DIGEST, Nov. 1993, available at
http://spice.stanford.edu/digests/Japan/digest6-pfv.html.
143.
ALEJANDRO NADAL, THE ENVIRONMENTAL & SOCIAL IMPACTS OF ECONOMIC
LIBERALIZATION ON CORN PRODUCTION IN MEXICO 8 (2000).
144.
Id.
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obligations they have accepted. 145 Although it has been suggested
that WTO law is a self-contained regime, the very first report of the
Appellate Body refuted this position, stating that WTO agreements
1 46
are not be "read in clinical isolation from public international law."'
According to Article 3(2) of the Dispute Settlement Understanding,
WTO panels and the Appellate Body are to apply the "customary
law,"'1 47 above all the
rules of interpretation of public international
148
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
Because ICESCR has been ratified by a large number of
countries but not all WTO members, the question has arisen as to
whether the reference in article 31(3)c VCLT to the parties should be
considered as a reference to the parties to the dispute, or to all the
parties to the treaty under interpretation.1 49 Since the WTO, in
contrast to human rights treaties, admits non-sovereign members
such as Hong Kong, it is impossible for the WTO to have an identical
membership to any treaty.150 Relevant rules of treaties with broad
membership, such as human rights treaties, can therefore be
considered in WTO disputes. The Appellate Body confirmed this
principle in US-Shrimp when it examined the notion of "exhaustible
resources" by referring to a number of multilateral environmental
agreements. 151 Although many of the agreements did not have the

145.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31(3)(c), May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 340 [hereinafter VCLT]; Breining-Kaufmann, supra note 3, at 115.
Appellate Body Report, United States-Standards for Reformulated and
146.
Conventional Gasoline,§ IIIB, WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 22, 1996) [hereinafter United States
Gasoline]. See generally JOOST PAUWELYN, CONFLICT OF NORMS IN PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW: HOW WTO LAW RELATES TO OTHER RULES OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW (2003) (providing a comprehensive analysis on the relationship of trade law to
public international law).
147.
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization,, Annex 2, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 1869
U.N.T.S. 401 (1994), available at http://www.wto.org/englishdocs-e/legal-e/28-dsu.pdf
[hereinafter DSU]; see also Panel Report, Korea-Measures Affecting Government
7.96, WT[DS163/R (May 1, 2000) (noting that "[clustomary
Procurement,
international law applies generally to the economic relations between the WTO
Members").
148.
See VCLT, supra note 145 (explaining that states must comply with all
obligations that they have accepted).
149.
See Gabrielle Marceau, WTO Dispute Settlement and Human Rights, 13
EUR. J. INT'L. L. 753, 781 (2002) (noting that the use of the word "parties" could be
interpreted to mean either all WTO members or those members which are parties to
the dispute).
Id. (noting that the requirement for identical membership would lead to the
150.
paradoxical result that as the WTO membership grows, fewer international
agreements would match its membership and thus, the WTO would become
increasingly "isolated from other international systems of law").
151.
See Appellate Body Report, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain
127-34, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998) [hereinafter
Shrimp and Shrimp Products,
United States-Import Prohibition](examining multilateral environmental agreements
such as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the Resolution on
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same membership as the WTO, 152 the Appellate Body nevertheless
took them into consideration reasoning that there was evidence of
sufficient consensus on some elements of the term "exhaustible
153
resources."'
The situation was different in EC-Biotech, where the Panel
found that the Cartagena Protocol cannot be regarded as "any
relevant rule of international law applicable in the relations between
the parties," since "the European Communities is the only party in
154
this WTO dispute bound by the provisions of the Protocol."'
In its final report, the International Law Commission's Study
Group on Fragmentation supported the Appellate Body's approach in
US-Shrimp with regard to Article 31(3)c VCLT and developed a
general rule. 155 It held that "Article 31(3)(c) also requires the
interpreter to consider other treaty-based rules" to arrive at a
consistent meaning. 156 "Such []rules are of particular relevance
where parties to the treaty [that is being] interpret[ed] are also
parties to the other treaty."'15 7 The rules are also relevant "where the
treaty rule has passed into or expresses customary international
law," or where the treaties "provide evidence of the common
understanding of the parties as to the object and purpose of the treaty
158
under interpretation or as to the meaning of a particular term.'
Furthermore, the Study Group clarified the distinction between
jurisdiction and applicable law. 159 While Articles 3(2) and 19(2) of
the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes (DSU) limit jurisdiction by providing that the
Dispute Settlement cannot add to or diminish from the rights and
obligations of Members provided in the covered agreements, "there is
160
no explicit provision identifying the scope of applicable law.'
Hence,

Assistance to Developing Countries); Marceau, supra note 152, at 781 (noting that the
Appellate Body disapproved of the "identical membership" approach in United StatesImport Prohibitionthrough examination of numbers multilateral agreements).
152.
United States-Import Prohibition,supra note 151, T 127-34.
153.
Id.
154.
Panel Report, European Communities-Measures Affecting the Approval
and Marketing of Biotech Products, 4.688, WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R, WT/DS293/R
(Sep. 29, 2006) [hereinafter Biotech Panel Report].
155.
Int'l Law Comm'n, Fragmentationof InternationalLaw: Difficulties Arising
from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law,
17, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/L.702 (July 18, 2006).
156.
Id. 21.
157.

Id.

158.
Id.
159.
See Int'l Law Comm'n, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties
Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of InternationalLaw,
45, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/L.682 (Apr. 13, 2006).
160.
Id.
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even [though] the competence of WTO bodies is limited to consideration
of claims under the covered agreements (and not, for example, under 0
human rights treaties) . . . WTO bodies must situate the rights and
obligations under the covered agreements within the overall context of
general international law (including the relevant 0 human rights
treaties). 161

In addition to treaty interpretation, general exceptions in Article
XX of the GATT provide another mechanism for reconciling the
objectives of the multilateral trading system with those of human
rights law. 162 Article XX grants exceptions from the most-favored
nation principle in order to protect "important state interests,"163
such as, inter alia, protecting public morals, 164 protecting human life,
or promoting health. 16 5 The concept of public morals is "not an
established concept in international law," however; in fact, "[a]t least
since the Second World War, human rights have been considered a
core element of public morality.' 1 66 The right to food has been so
widely accepted that it could be regarded as being part of the public
morals of most states. 16 7 From a human rights perspective, the
concept of "human life and health is connected to a wide range of
economic, social, and cultural rights relating to a person's wellbeing.' 6 8 A strong case could be made for reading the right to food,
and specifically food security, into article XX(b) GATT, since without
the realization of the right to food, human health suffers and life can
be endangered. 169 Professor Breining-Kaufmann elaborates:
If a state can establish that a measure violates the most-favored nation
principle 0 for reasons mentioned in Article XX(a) or (b), the measure
still needs to comply with the chapeau of Article XX, which is an
expression of the principle of good faith .... Measures taken under
Article XX . . . [cannot] arbitrarily discriminate between countries
where the same conditions prevail[,] . . .[and are justified only if they]
70
do not result in a disguised restriction of international trade.1

To sum up, this Article argues that the two sets of obligations
under the right to food and agricultural trade can in most cases be

161.
Id.
170.
162.
See generally GATT, supra note 11, art. XX (GATT remains applicable for
trade in agriculture, except to the extent that the AoA contains specific provisions
dealing specifically with the same matter, which is not the case with GATT article XX).
163.
United States Gasoline, supranote 146, at 28.
164.
GATT, supranote 11, art. XX(a).
165.
Id. art. XX(b).
166.
Breining-Kaufmann, supra note 3, at 107.
167.
Mechlem, supra note 10, at 173.
168.
OHCHR, HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD TRADE AGREEMENTS: USING GENERAL
EXCEPTION CLAUSES TO PROTECT HUMAN RIGHTS 5 (2005).
169.
Mechlem, supra note 10, at 173.
170.
Breining-Kaufmann, supra note 3, at 108; see generally MARION PANIZZON,
GOOD FAITH IN THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE WTO: THE PROTECTION OF LEGITIMATE
EXPECTATIONS, GOOD FAITH INTERPRETATION AND FAIR DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (Hart
Publ'g 2006).
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interpreted in a conciliatory manner. Whenever possible, provisions
in international trade law must be interpreted in light of the existing
human rights obligations of the parties involved, thus providing for
coherence between the different obligations. However, a humanrights-compatible interpretation of WTO law may not apply to all
conflicts. An example of this is the issue of non-discrimination, which
will be examined further below.
C. Need for "Affirmative Action" to Ensure Non-Discrimination
As stated above, trade-liberalization in agriculture, even when
shown to have aggregate welfare gains, may have negative impacts at
the individual level. 171 Applying the human rights principle of nondiscrimination to trade law encourages affirmative action for the
affected individuals. Although non-discrimination is also a principle
of international trade law, there is a distinction in the application of
the principle; "in trade law, the principle of non-discrimination is
included in the principles of national treatment and most-favourednation treatment. '172 National treatment envisions "equal treatment
for nationals and non-nationals, whether they are poor farmers or
large agribusinesses or industrial firms.' 73 This notion of nondiscrimination is problematic for the enjoyment of human rights, as
"[t]reating unequals as equals . . . could result in the
institutionalization of discrimination against the poor and
1 74
marginalized."'
According to human rights law, states undertake to guarantee
that rights will be exercised "without discrimination of any kind as to
race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion,
national or social origin, property, birth, or other status.' 1 75 The
Human Rights Committee elaborated in its General Comment No. 18
that non-discrimination under human rights law "sometimes
requires . . . affirmative action to diminish or eliminate the

171.
BEN-DAVID ET AL., supra note 5 (discussing the connection between trade
liberalization and poverty).
172.
ECOSOC, Comm'n on Human Rights, Globalization and its Impact on the
Full Enjoyment of Human Rights: Report of the High Commissionerfor Human Rights
Submitted in Accordance with Commission on Human Rights Resolution 2001/32, at
24 n.42, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2002/54 (Jan. 15, 2002).
Id. 43.
173.
174.
Id. Indirect discrimination "occurs when a neutral measure has a disparate
and discriminatory effect on different groups of people and that measure cannot be
justified by reasonable and objective criteria." ECOSOC, Comm'n on Human Rights,
Analytical study of the High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Fundamental
12, U.N. Doc.
Principle of Non-Discrimination in the Context of Globalization,
E/CN.4/2004/40 (Jan. 15, 2004); see also Craven, supra note 100, at 166-67 (noting that
policies are considered discriminatory if their effects are discriminating in practice,
even if those effects were not intended).
ICESCR, supra note 2, art. 2(2).
175.
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conditions" preventing the enjoyment of human rights for part of the
population. 176 Professor Breining-Kaufmann notes that, "[a]t first
glance, such a concept contrasts sharply with the principle of nondiscrimination in WTO law, which focuses on national treatment and
most favoured nation treatment."'177 She goes on to say, however,
that "the provisions for special and differential treatment as well as
the consideration of non-trade concerns could be instrumentalized for
178
affirmative action measures.'

V. SHAPING THE FUTURE RULES OF TRADE IN AGRICULTURE

The AoA was only the beginning of the liberalization process: its
Article 20 foresees new negotiations beginning one year before the
end of its implementation period. 179
It also states that the
negotiations must take into account "non-trade concerns, special and
differential treatment of developing country [m]embers, the objective
to establish a fair and market-oriented agricultural trading system,
and the other objectives and concerns mentioned in the preamble to
th[e] Agreement.. .. "180
The Fourth Ministerial Conference and the resulting Doha
Ministerial Declaration of November 2001 (Doha Declaration)
launched a new round of multilateral trade negotiations. With
respect to agriculture, the Doha Declaration built on the work already
done, elaborated on the objectives of the negotiations, and set a
timetable for their conclusion.1 8
WTO Members committed
18 2
themselves to substantial improvements in market access.
Members additionally committed themselves to "reductions of, with a
view to phasing out, all forms of export subsidies; and substantial
reductions in trade-distorting domestic support."'18 3 It was also

176.
ECOSOC, Comm'n on Human Rights, General Comment No. 18, Nondiscrimination, 10 (Nov. 10, 1989), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/
(Symbol)/3888b0541f8501c9c12563ed004b8d0e?opendocument.
177.
Breining-Kaufmann, supra note 23, at 375.
178.
Id.
179.
AoA, supra note 14, art. 20. (The end of the implementation period was the
end of 1999. Negotiations began in early 2000.)
180.
Id. art. 20(c).
181.
See World Trade Org., Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001,
13-14, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 (Nov. 14, 2001) [hereinafter Doha Declaration]. Since the
negotiations under Article 20 of the AoA were initiated, a large number of negotiating
proposals have been submitted on behalf of a total of 121 Members. Included was a
submission by Mauritius identifying the right to food as particularly relevant for future
negotiations on the provisions of the AoA dealing with "non-trade concerns." Special
Session of the Comm. on Agric., Note on Non-Trade Concerns, 44, G/AG/NGIW/36/Rev.1
(Nov. 9, 2000).
182.
Doha Declaration, supra note 181,
13.
183.
Id.
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agreed "that special and differential treatment for developing
countries [would] be an integral part of all elements of the
negotiations and would be embodied in the Schedules of concessions
and commitments ... so as to be operationally effective and to enable
developing countries to effectively take account of their development
needs, including food security and rural development." 18 4 In addition,
given the lack of progress on the Marrakesh Decision, the Doha
Declaration included the resolutions made at Marrakesh amongst its
implementation issues. 185 Since the Doha Ministerial Conference, the
agenda has been revised several times. After a deadlock at the
Canciin Ministerial Conference in 2003, it took until August 2004 to
8 6
In
reach an agreement on the framework for further negotiations.'
December 2005, the Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong confirmed
an important issue relevant for food security in the ongoing
negotiations: with regard to market access, the Ministerial
Declaration holds that "[d]eveloping country Members will have the
flexibility to self-designate an appropriate number of tariff lines as
criteria of food
Special Products guided by indicators based on the
18 7
security, livelihood security and rural development.'
Not surprisingly, given the manifold interests at stake, the
negotiations are difficult. The following sections will look at some of
these issues in more detail.
A. Market Access
WTO Members agreed to adopt four bands for structuring tariff
cuts, with the two objectives of (1) cutting more deeply the higher
tariff levels, and (2) cutting tariffs from bound rates rather than
88
applied rates.1
With regard to food security, both developing and developed
countries will be able to designate "sensitive products" for which tariff
l89
This
cuts will be more lenient than those required by the formula.
may be an avenue for tackling the aforementioned issue of culturally
significant foodstuffs, such as Japanese rice and Mexican corn.
In addition, for developing countries, various mechanisms have
been proposed to mitigate the risks associated with the further

Id.
184.
2-3, 6.
Id.
185.
See World Trade Org., Doha Work Programme: Decision Adopted by the
186.
General Council on 1 August 2004, T 1, WTJL/579 (Aug. 1, 2004) [hereinafter July
Framework].
World Trade Org., Doha Work Programme:Ministerial Decision adopted on
187.
7, WT/MIN(05)/DEC. (Dec. 18, 2005) [hereinafter Hong Kong
18 December 2005,
Declaration].
29. For a detailed account of the
Id.; July Framework, supra note 186,
188.
negotiations, see McMAHON, supra note 12 at 224-48.
July Framework, supra note 186, 31.
189.
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opening of agricultural markets to international trade, either by
excluding certain special products from the full extent of tariff
reduction, or by permitting the imposition of an additional tariff in
the face of sudden increases in imports-a special safeguard
mechanism. 190
Special Products are products self-designated by a developing
country as being particularly important to its overall development
because of their significant role in enhancing food security, livelihood
security, and rural development. 191 These products will be exempted
from the full extent of any tariff reductions agreed to in the Doha
Round of trade negotiations. 1 92 Simply designating these products
without clearly linking that designation to enhancing food security,
livelihood security, and rural development might help to achieve an
agreement in the WTO, but would not necessarily contribute to the
achievement of development goals. 193 Therefore, the Food and
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) has developed
a methodology for identifying Special Products by appropriate
indicators for the three criteria of food security, livelihood security,
and rural development. 194 In the revised draft modalities, dated 17
July 2007, the Chair of the Agriculture Special Sessions outlines the
methodological challenges of indicators designating special products
that need to be tackled before a precise text could be drafted and
agreed upon, but also states that there had been some convergence in
the positions of WTO members lately. 195
It was also agreed that developing countries should "have the
right of recourse to a Special Safeguard Mechanism based on import
quantity and price triggers" to protect them against price slumps and
import surges. 196
Both Special Products and the new Special
Safeguard Mechanism will be crucial mechanisms offering countries
the flexibility to use measures at their borders to protect the
livelihoods of small-scale and subsistence farmers. 19 7 Even though
the Hong Kong Declaration reiterates that "Special Products and the

190.
See Hong Kong Declaration, supra note 187, Annex A, 16.
191.
Id.
192.
Id. 7.
193.
See FAO, The State of Agricultural Commodity Markets 2006, at 11 (2007)
[hereinafter State of Agriculture].
194.
Deep Ford et al., Identifying "Special Products"-Developing Country
Flexibility in the Doha Round, in COMMODITY MARKET REVIEW 2005-2006, at 5, 10-17
(FAO ed., 2005); see also, e.g., LOUISE BERNAL, METHODOLOGY FOR THE IDENTIFICATION
OF SPECIAL PRODUCTS (SP) AND PRODUCTS FOR ELIGIBILITY UNDER SPECIAL
SAFEGUARD MECHANISM (SSM) BY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (Int'l Centre for Trade &

Sustainable Dev. 2005).
195.
Special Session of the Comm. On Agric., Draft Modalities for Agriculture,
90-97 (July 17, 2007), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/agric-e/
agchairtxt_17july07-e.pdf.
196.
Hong Kong Declaration, supra note 187, 7.
197.
Mechlem, supra note 10, at 181.
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Special Safeguard Mechanism shall be an integral part of the
modalities and the outcome of negotiations in agriculture,' 198 both
mechanisms remain controversial and negotiators in the Doha Round
have struggled to reach acceptable operational solutions. 199 As of
May 2007, it seems that a consensus on special agricultural
safeguards can only0 be reached, if at all, for a "very considerably
reduced coverage."

20

B. Domestic Support

The Total Aggregate Measurement of Support defines three
bands, or categories, of countries for the purposes of defining
reductions goals, with all developing countries in

the bottom band

requiring the least reduction. 20 1 Some developing countries proposed
a "Development Box. ' 20 2 They argued that the Green Box had been
used to accommodate the non-trade concerns of developed countries
rather than address similar concerns of developing countries, such as
20 3
food security and the protection of small farmers' livelihoods.
Contrastingly,
developed
countries
are
concerned
that
accommodating such requests would open a "Pandora's Box of large-

scale subsidisation by developing countries." 20 4 What was agreed to,
therefore, was a review of the Green Box criteria to ensure that the

programs of developing countries are effectively covered. 20 5 That is,
the goal is to make Green Box criteria more development-oriented
and better tailored to the realities of agriculture in developing

198.
Hong Kong Declaration, supra note 187, 7.
199.
See, e.g., Special Session of the Comm. on Agric., Communication from the
Chairman of the Comm. on
Agric.,
(Apr.
30, 2007),
available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/agric-e/agchairtxt_30apr07-e.pdf
[hereinafter
Communication from the Chairman] (stating that existing positions on Special
Products are "a long way apart" and have the potential to sink the whole negotiations).
200. Id.
139.
201.
Hong Kong Declaration, supra note 187, 5.
202.
Special Session of the Comm. on Agric., Agreement on Agriculture: Green
Box/Annex 2 Subsidies, G/AG[NG/W/14 (June 23, 2000). This proposal was presented
by the so-called like-minded group in agriculture, consisting of Cuba, the Dominican
Republic, El Salvador, Haiti, Honduras, Kenya, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Sri-Lanka,
Uganda, and Zimbabwe. See generally SOPHIA MURPHY & STEVEN SUPPAN,
INTRODUCTION TO THE DEVELOPMENT Box-FINDING SPACE FOR DEVELOPMENT
CONCERNS IN WTO'S AGRICULTURE NEGOTIATIONS (International Institute for
Sustainable
Development,
2003),
available at http://www.agtradepolicy.org/
output/resource/DB.pdf
203. Id.
204. See Special Session of the Comm. on Agric., Agriculture Negotiations:
Status Report II Looking Forward to the Hong Kong Ministerial,at 10, TN/AG/19 (Aug.
1, 2005); Mechlem, supra note 10, at 182.
205. Hong Kong Declaration, supra note 187,
5. But see MCMAHON, supra note
12, at 246 (observing that although there was some movement on promoting
development-friendly Green Box policies, there had been little discernible convergence
on the review and clarification of the Box).
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countries. 20 6 In addition, following the current negotiations, the
''current permissible ceiling for developed countries" under the Blue
Box will be reduced from 5% to 2.5%.207
C. Export Competition
The main achievement of the Doha Declaration was the
commitment by Members to negotiate to reduce all forms of export
subsidies with a view to phasing them out. 208 At the Hong Kong
Ministerial Conference, Ministers agreed on the parallel elimination
of "all forms of export subsidies and disciplines on all export
measures with equivalent effect . . . by the end of 2013. ' ' 209

As

provided for in the Marrakesh Decision, the disciplines will make
provisions for special and differential treatment for LDCs and
210
NFIDCs.
Disciplines to be developed regarding food aid would ensure the
elimination of commercial displacement and address issues such as
"in-kind food aid, monetization, and re-exports[,] [ensuring] that
''211
It
there can be no loop-hole for continuing export subsidisation.
was agreed that a "safe box" would be developed for bona fide
emergency food aid to ensure that there are no unintended
impediments when dealing with emergency situations.2 12 In this
context, the question of how to ensure food aid was discussed
intensively; the food aid would "be need-driven, untied from
commercial exports of goods or services, and should not be linked [to]
the market development objectives of the donor Member. ' 213 One
potential solution put forward was to include a definition of
emergency situations in WTO law.2 14
The Chairman of the
Committee on Agriculture was quite clear in answering such
proposals when he replied:
[I]t seems to me at least clear that WTO has no business trying to set
itself up as the authority to pass judgement on these things. It simply
has no credibility as it does not have the expertise to do so; nor is its
function to set itself up as some kind of judge and jury on such matters
within the international system. The definition that has been under
consideration is that of the World Food Programme. . . .Therefore, in
the absence of a compelling reason to override the definitions used by
those that are responsible for administering and delivering food aid the

206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
186,

July Framework, supra note 186, 7 16.
Communication from the Chairman, supra note 199, 30.
Doha Declaration, supra note 181, 13; Mechlem, supra note 10, at 183.
Hong Kong Declaration, supra note 187, T 6.
Reform Programme, supra note 20, IT 4-5; July Framework, supra note

24.

211.
212.
213.

Hong Kong Declaration, supra note 187, T 6.
Id.
Communication from the Chairman, supranote 199,

214.

Id.

58.

57.
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furthest it would seem to me to be reasonable to go as regards a
215
definition is to include the WFP definition as a reference.

With this reference to competent authorities outside the WTO,
the negotiators are adopting the legal approach first used by the
Appellate Body in US-Shrimp. It seems that, as of May 2007, this
approach will also be applied with regard to operational issues, such
as the question of which entity should be responsible for a needs
assessment and an emergency appeals process.2 16 Currently the plan
is to refer to the relevant United Nations agencies, the International
Committee of the Red Cross, and the International Federation of the
Red Cross. 217 While this development may seem natural at first
glance, it will be a very big step for the WTO once it enters into force.
In dispute settlement, there has only been one case so far in which
the body settling the dispute asked for the advice of another
organization. 218
In Thai-Cigarettes,219 the World Health
Organization-with the consent of the parties to the disputedelivered a report.

VI. CONCLUSION

The two legal frameworks of international trade in agriculture
and the right to food seem to pursue the same abstract objective of
raising standards of living.
This Article concludes that both
frameworks were carefully drafted to make them, at least in
principle, reconcilable, although for some groups or individuals,
affirmative action may be required to reach this goal. However,
concrete examples show that in practice conflicts arise between the
right to food and international trade law. Food security involves not
only legal but many other considerations, such as cultural
appropriateness and importance. Negotiations on these issues are
ongoing in the Committee on Agriculture, and progress has been
made in reconciling the two legal regimes. Further steps, however,
are necessary.
Since the return to full-negotiation mode in February 2007, the
Chair of the Committee on Agriculture has issued a number of papers
intended to motivate participants to allow some flexibility and move

215.

Id.

216.
217.
218.

See id. 60.
See id. 61.
See Panel Report, Thailand-Restrictionson Importation of and Internal

Taxes on Cigarettes, DSIO/R - 37S/200 (adoptedNov. 7, 1990) (relying on advice from the
World Health Organization).
219.
Id.
50-57.
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away from current positions toward consensus. 220 The slow progress
of the negotiations illustrates the difficulties in balancing the
measures intended to address the concerns of developing
countries-such as Special Products and the Special Safeguard
Mechanism-with "the long-term objective . . .of establishing a fair

and
market-oriented
agricultural
trading
system
through
strengthened and more operationally effective GATT rules and
disciplines that result in the correction and prevention of restrictions
221
and distortions in world agricultural trade.
While slow progress is not a problem per se, from a right to food
perspective, sequence and pace matters in the transition from
traditional agriculture to competitive production.
Developing
countries need policy space to protect their small-scale and
subsistence farmers from being displaced as a consequence of reduced
tariffs and the lack of alternative earning opportunities. 222 Today,
close to eighty percent of the world's 852 million hungry live in rural
areas. 223 The majority of those facing hunger and malnutrition are
subsistence farmers who depend mainly or partly on agriculture for
their livelihoods. 224 In fact, it is estimated that half of the world's
hungry people are peasants who eke out a living from small plots of
land.225 Since most developing countries lack unemployment benefit
schemes or other social safety nets, poor farmers who are displaced
due to their lack of competitiveness are forced to find alternative
incomes in order to survive. That being said, history shows that such
alternatives will most likely take the form of low-productivity work in
the urban informal sector, or emigration. 226 In this context, it is
interesting to note that the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the
Right to Food, in his most recent report, pointed out the need to
recognize refugees from hunger. 227
He argues that the
extraterritorial obligation of states under the ICESCR must include
the principle of non-refoulement where there are substantial grounds
for believing that a person's fundamental right to be free from hunger
228
would be at risk.

220.
See e.g., Communication from the Chairman, supra note 199 (discussing
"ideas on where members' positions might converge").
221.

See MCMAHON, supra note 12, at 223.

222.
Mechlem, supra note 10, at 182.
223.
U.N. Millennium Project 2005, Task Force on Hunger, Halving Hunger: It
Can Be Done, at 19, 154 (2005).
224.
Id. at 3.
225.
Id. at 4-5.
226.
SANDRA POLASKI, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT'L PEACE, AGRICULTURAL
NEGOTIATIONS AT THE WTO: FIRST, Do No HARM 5 (2005).

227.
U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right
to Food, U.N. Doc.
62-67, A/HRC/4/30 (Jan. 19, 2007) (prepared by Jean Ziegler).
228.
Id. T 64-67, 69. See also MICHELLE FOSTER, INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE
LAW AND SoCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS-REFUGEE FROM DEPRIVATION (2007) (discussing

1070

VANDERBIL TJOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LA W

[VOL. 40.1039

To sum up, "although critical to the resolution of the current
round of negotiations, the designation of Special Products and the
Special Safeguard Mechanism are measures that, .

.

. on their own,

cannot address long-term structural problems of agriculture in
developing countries. '229 Many of them face supply-side constraints,
particularly a lack of rural infrastructure, high-yield seed, water,
technical assistance, and other necessary inputs for their production.
Thus, their agriculture sectors are often uncompetitive and prevent
them from capitalizing on new trade opportunities, especially for
processed and value-added products. 230 Developing countries will
have to become competitive, and they will need assistance to reach a
level where they are able to compete. This need is apparent in the
current discussions of the "aid-for-trade" initiative 231 and a new
"Geneva Consensus," 23 2 which will make trade work for development.
It thus becomes clear that a legal background that allows
liberalized trade in agriculture to be reconciled with the right to food
is not enough to alleviate the plight of people and countries in need.
Life is not taking place in textbooks but in the real world, where law
is crucial in establishing a fair system that creates a level playing
field for everybody. Yet in order to craft rules that can accommodate
the many features of food security, rule makers need to learn more
about the different relationships with culture, rural development, and
other factors. Is this an impossible mission? The answer is certainly
no. However, it will take more research and knowledge before we can
declare mission accomplished.
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